Chinese housing prices rose by over 10 percent per year in real terms between 2003 and 2014, and are now between two and ten times higher than the construction cost of apartments. At the same time, Chinese developers built 100 billion square feet of residential real estate. This boom has been accompanied by a large increase in the number of vacant homes, held by both developers and households. This boom may turn out to be a housing bubble followed by a crash, yet that future is far from certain. The demand for real estate in China is so strong that current prices might be sustainable, especially given the sparse alternative investments for Chinese households, so long as the level of new supply is radically curtailed. Whether that happens depends on the policies of the Chinese government, which must weigh the benefits of price stability against the costs of restricting urban growth.
This U.S. housing cycle looks stable and dull relative to the great Chinese real estate boom. In China's top cities, real prices grew by 13.1 percent annually from 2003 to 2013 (Fang et al., 2015) . Real land prices in 35 large Chinese cities increased almost 5-fold between 2004 and 2015 (Wu, Gyourko, and Deng, 2015) . As prices rose, so did construction. We begin by reviewing these facts and two other striking differences between the housing booms in the U.S. and China. Unlike in the U.S., high vacancy rates are a distinct feature of Chinese housing markets. Vacancies include both completed units unsold by developers, and purchased units that remain unoccupied. We estimate that this stock of empty housing now adds up to at least about 20 billion square feet.
The final profound difference from the U.S. is the much greater and quite distinctive public sector engagement with real estate in China, beginning with the fact that all urban land is owned by the government, and private individuals only buy and sell "use rights," which were originally bought from local governments and run for a maximum of 70 years. It is unclear what the government will do when those use rights expire. While many U.S. local governments, especially on the coasts, fight against new development, Chinese local governments encourage building to boost local output and employment, as well as to raise revenue from land sales. The U.S. government subsidizes housing through tax and credit policies, but does not have nearly as aggressive a home-building promotion program as its Chinese counterpart.
The dramatic size of the Chinese boom has left the world wondering whether the Chinese real estate is a bubble waiting to burst. We approach this question by analyzing the determinants of demand and supply of housing in China. On the demand side, we examine the economic, demographic, cultural, and speculative factors shaping demand. We also consider valuations of apartment prices in China as a gauge of frothiness. Fang et al. (2015) find that price to income ratios range from 6 to 10 in their sample of Chinese cities --high but not unusually so. They also show that Chinese price growth is not faster than income growth. Their data stop in 2012, and relies on mortgage applicants with relatively high incomes. Since then, prices continued to rise dramatically in some cities. As of 2016, a 90 square meter apartment in Beijing or Shanghai fetches more than 25 times average household income. Even so, conclusions on the valuation of Chinese housing based on demand factors turn critically on difficult-to-forecast national growth rates. If China continues to grow very fast, high prices can be justified.
The supply-side approach to housing fundamentals is to compare housing prices to the physical costs of construction, and an assessment of the long-run price of land. Building costs can be precisely estimated, but land values are hard to predict in markets where supply is constrained by geography and regulation. The supply approach to Chinese housing suggests the prices are far too high, especially outside the few top cities. Construction costs are typically less than onethird of the selling price of finished space in these cities. Absent regulation, land is not scarce in the country as a whole, especially away from the coast. The rapid pace of construction and the vast number of vacant units support the view that supply is currently quite elastic.
To put our empirical results together, we simulate possible prices in 20 years. We assume that speculative demand for housing cannot be sustained in the long run and home prices stabilize at about 10 times income, a high but not implausible level by global standards. If income growth is robust and housing supply growth is effectively muted, then equilibrium prices in 20 years for apartments in top tier cities could exceed 2 million RMB. But even if income growth stays high, real returns on housing will be negative if future supply is as ample as it has been in the past.
We conclude that a housing crash is not inevitable, and the outcome depends on decisions made by the Chinese government. Only if new construction is sufficiently restricted can prices remain
high. Yet the social costs of restricting new housing supply could be enormous, because of both the lower employment and reduced growth of China's hyper-productive cities. This is indeed a real estate boom with Chinese characteristics: like much of modern China, its fate rests ultimately with government decisions.
Four Differences between the Booms in China and the U.S.
In this section, we compare four aspects of the great housing booms of China and the U.S.: prices, construction, vacancies, and the roles of respective governments. While the U.S. may be a less natural comparison for China than other middle income countries (like Brazil), the U.S. housing boom is well measured and particularly well studied. It offers a benchmark that helps to put the Chinese boom into perspective and highlight its unique features.
Housing Price Growth in China and the U.S.
Housing price growth and decline between 1996 and 2012 in the U.S. are well documented, typically using repeat sales indices prepared both by private industry, such as the Case-Shiller index, and by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Two facts about the U.S. housing prices are well-documented and largely uncontroversial. First, housing prices grew dramatically after 1996 and then fell dramatically after 2007. Second, there was considerable heterogeneity in price growth across metropolitan areas, which is typically related to supply elasticities (Saiz, 2010; Glaeser, 2013) .
Official statistics in China show a "mere" doubling of housing prices between 2007 and 2014 (Chivakul et al., 2015) and some degree of moderation recently. These statistics are often questioned as understating actual price growth. Fang et al. (2015) present the most compelling work to date on quality-adjusted housing price growth in China. Their data for new homes uses development project fixed effects to control for changing quality. They thus estimate price changes by comparing sales prices of units of comparable size in the same development project sold in different years. While this approach is only likely to yield price estimates for the newer housing stock, it seems far more reliable than any feasible alternative.
China's cities are typically divided into four categories or tiers, based on the level of economic development. The first tier includes only four most developed metropolitan areas: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. These are the areas where demand is most robust and supply is most likely to be restricted. The second tier includes most provincial capitals and some very developed prefecture cities. They are typically large, industrialized, and have relatively strong local economies. Tier 3 includes prefecture cities that have medium to high levels of income, which are smaller but still large by western standards. Tier 4 cities are further down in economic development and size, but still very populous compared to the average western city.
As these categories are the norm in Chinese real estate analysis, for the comparison with the U.S.
we create corresponding tiers of U.S. cities. We first rank cities in the U.S. according to income per capita in 1990, prior to the start of the U.S. housing boom. We then draw tiers based on income and require that each tier has the same population share as their Chinese counterpart. For each line, the start year is given a value of one. The Chinese growth is far more dramatic.
Housing price growth in U.S. We compare the construction of physical, typically residential, real estate in the two countries.
In the U.S., household surveys provide estimates of the total housing stock on an annual or quarterly basis. The U.S. Census also asks households about the year in which their home was built, which shows that in 2000, 9.7 percent of Americans lived in homes that had been built in the previous five years. 2 In addition, the Census provides measures of the flow of new housing construction, such as the flow of new building permits and estimates of total units completed.
Chinese census data provide snapshots of the housing stock at points in time, but are less comprehensive than their U.S. equivalents. There are also estimates of new construction activity at the country and provincial level on an annual basis. China is much poorer and its housing units are much smaller, and yet it is producing about as much floor space per person as the U.S.
One of the striking facts about U.S. growth is that more housing was built in less productive areas, which creates a mismatch between productivity and employment discussed by Hsieh and Moretti (2015) . Figure 3a shows a -0.29 correlation between per capita income in 1990 and housing supply growth between 1990 and 2010. A major reason for this misallocation of construction is supply restrictions in the most productive cities, such as zoning regulations (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008) . Figure 3b shows the same striking negative relationship For China, our primary source for developers' inventory is Soufun, which compiles data from local housing bureaus (Fangguanju). The data covers developers' inventories for 32 major Chinese cities. We combine this data with statistics on vacant homes held by households, which is based on the Chinese Urban Household Survey (UHS). Figure 4 shows estimates of inventory by tier over time. We estimate inventories for each tier using the tier's inventory per capita in the Soufun data multiplied by the tier's urban population. and is concentrated not in the most successful cities, but in the less developed ones.
Visitors to Chinese cities are sometimes struck by the number of vacant apartments. Many of these units are owned by investors who just leave their properties empty. We can get some sense of this stock of purchased but vacant units by looking at the Urban Household Survey. We compute a vacancy rate across 36 cities by calculating the total number of vacant units owned by the residents of each city and then dividing by the total number of housing units owned or occupied by the city's residents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that owning properties outside one's own metropolitan area is rare. In Table 1 , we combine estimates of total developer inventories with estimates of total household vacancies. To ensure representativeness, we use vacancy estimates based on the 2009 UHS. 4 We take the average vacant space per capita in each tier and estimate total vacant space in that tier by multiplying by its urban population. This estimate is conservative, as vacancy rates increased since then. We pair the vacancy estimates with inventory estimates for 2014 to provide an up-todate picture, as total developer inventories almost doubled from 2011 to 2014. Data for 2014 also covers the largest set of cities in our developer inventory dataset.
The estimates imply that there are 16 square feet per capita of vacant real estate in Tier 1 cities, of which 10 square feet is owned by private investors and 5.5 square feet is owned by developers.
The total would be 20 square feet per capita if we instead used the Urban Household Survey from 2012. In Tier 2 cities, there is 37 square feet per capita of vacant real estate, split more or less evenly between developers and private investors. There are 30 square feet per capita in Tier 3 cities. In the cross section of cities, both developer inventories and household vacancies on a per capita basis are highly positively correlated with past price growth.
These data provide a picture of an enormous stock of unoccupied new housing in China, which dwarfs the U.S. equivalent in 2006. The combination of crowded cities and empty housing stock is a highly distinctive feature of Chinese housing today.
A Regulated Bubble? The Greater Role of the Public Sector in China
The American real estate sector is hardly a bastion of laissez-faire capitalism. A web of local land use controls regulate the industry and restricts supply, while national policies, including the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, the home mortgage interest deduction and the GovernmentSponsored Enterprises subsidize construction. Still, the dynamics of the industry are only modestly shaped by the national and local governments.
In China, the public sector retains far more control over future prices and construction. Most importantly and dramatically, all land in China is owned by the state and the central government decides which land can be auctioned to private developers. Land auctions do not confer permanent ownership, but rather the right to use the land for several decades (up to 70 years).
Article 70 But the decline of formal public construction activity does not mean that the private construction operates without public guidance. Both the central and local governments are deeply involved in the housing market, and government incentives play a key role in shaping market outcomes.
Since Deng Xiaoping declared that "to get rich is glorious," China's leaders have promoted economic growth with remarkable success, with construction playing a pivotal role in these efforts. Leaders of local governments are promoted or penalized depending upon their ability to attain national growth objectives (Li and Zhou, 2005) . With ample credit and low construction costs, developers build towers that add to the G.D.P. The construction activity itself is measurable economic output, and ideally the buildings then attract commercial and residential tenants who further boost local growth.
Another important incentive that pushes Chinese governments, particularly the local governments, towards real estate development comes from the Chinese tax system. The tax system in China leaves local governments with a limited stream of ongoing fiscal revenues. A key source of fiscal income is land sales revenue, which is collected in the transfer of stateowned land to developers. Taxation of real estate development and apartment sales also contributes to local fiscal revenue. In some years, revenues from land sales accounted for as much as 40 percent of local government fiscal revenue (Wu, 2015) . This revenue system helps explain why Chinese local governments are very enthusiastic about new construction.
Since the late 2000s, the central government has increasingly shifted focus to housing market stability, and has held the local governments accountable for price stability targets. Under the central government's guidance, local governments have sought to stabilize housing prices, using restrictions or subsidies on home purchases and tightening or loosening controls on new development. The goals of economic growth and price stability, however, are often in conflict:
maintaining high prices by restricting supply undermines the growth coming from construction.
Government interventions impact all players in the Chinese housing market. When it comes to developers, the Chinese local governments, like their U.S. counterparts, regularly impose land use restrictions such as maximum floor-area ratios, although developers sometimes manage to exceed the originally mandated limit (Cai et al., forthcoming) . Unlike in the U.S., the Chinese central government also frequently intervenes to regulate local land development. Such interventions restrict the conversion of land from agricultural to urban uses, limit the use of land for golf courses and luxury housing, and mandate development of apartment with certain sizes.
When it comes to home buyers, American and Chinese governments have pursued very different policies. Despite some local land regulations, the US promotes homeownership through tax and credit policies. China is much more cautious. Interest rates on mortgages, as well as minimum down payments, tend to be high. To curtail speculation, Chinese governments have also tried to directly restrict second and third home purchases, and to limit the resale of homes in less than five years. Property taxation on home owners is strikingly different in the U.S. and China. U.S.
governments tax real estate on an annual basis, which creates a sizable cost to holding real estate.
Chinese real estate taxes are imposed only on transactions, creating an incentive to buy-and-hold.
When it comes to banks, state-owned institutions have historically dominated China's banking system, and at every level, banks' policies towards the housing market follow the government's lead. The financing for developers by government controlled banks is critical for understanding housing in China. Historically, China had very favorable credit policies toward developers, and banks are pushed to lend. Developers are highly leveraged, and to some extent enjoy the heads I win tails the bank loses situation. On the mortgage side, banks are also under government direction to adjust mortgage rates to discourage or occasionally subsidize home purchases, as part of housing market stability management. But banks have not been required to systematically support home ownership as they have been required to support construction. Although the government has become increasingly careful of risks in development loans and tightened them in recent years, the stockpile of debt is still enormous. According to official statistics, Chinese developers had $6.2 trillion of debt by 2014, whereas households had $3.8 trillion.
In sum, the main U.S. housing market policies encourage mortgage borrowing and restrict new development with local land use regulations. The most important Chinese housing market interventions boost local development and reduce home-related borrowing. With these policies, it is unsurprising that China builds much more than the U.S. It is perhaps more surprising that
Chinese housing price growth has been so much greater, given the discouragement of home borrowing and the encouragement of new supply. This strong demand for housing, as we discuss below, is mostly coming from Chinese households who flood the real estate market with their savings and investment demand, as opposed to a levered play on a "house of debt".
Does China Have a Real Estate Bubble?
Will China's real estate boom end in a bust? We discuss two approaches to assessing whether housing is in a bubble. The demand-side approach focuses on the motivations and the behavior of buyers, but also considers whether prices seem reasonable given proxies for the demand for housing services, such as income. The supply-side approach asks whether prices seem reasonable given the cost of delivering new real estate. Here we present some facts bearing on these two ways of thinking about China's housing boom, as before frequently comparing China and the U.S.
The Demand-Side Approach to Assessing Bubbles
In the U.S., many home buyers during the boom were young and highly leveraged. Mian and Sufi (2008) In China, housing investment is fueled by middle aged households saving for retirement or for their children's marriage. Home ownership has always played a prominent role in the Chinese society, and is remarkably high, standing at roughly 90 percent compared to about 65 percent in the US.
Chinese households are well known for high saving rates, motivated by many factors from economics to culture (Chamon and Prasad, 2010) . Chinese savers have been pushed towards housing as a crucial form of investment, not because it is easy to borrow but because it is difficult to invest. Chinese mortgage rates have often been much higher than in the U.S., and down payment requirements have rarely fallen below 20 percent. For Chinese savers buying real estate as investment assets, however, the more relevant cost of capital is not the mortgage rate but the opportunity cost of putting their funds elsewhere. Average real interest rate on bank 5 From 1998 to 2007, the 75 th percentile of the loan-to-value distribution for new buyers never fell below 95 percent in the U.S. The mean loan-to-value level was 74 percent in 2006 (over the first three mortgages on the home) reflecting the significant number of U.S. buyers who borrowed far less. deposits is about zero over the past decade. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Index has average annual real returns of zero from 2001 to 2016, which are anemic relative to more than 10% annual real returns to Shanghai real estate over the same period. Tight capital controls also restrict investing abroad. Moreover, traditional agrarian culture in China cultivates a strong preference for owning land and real estate. Painter, Yang, and Yu (2003) find that home ownership 18 percentage points higher among Chinese than among white households in the U.S.
controlling for household characteristics.
In addition to investing for wealth preservation, many Chinese households find it important to purchase real estate for their children, as home ownership is considered close to a necessity for marriage (and required especially for successful marriage of young men). This is reflected in a high home ownership rate among young Chinese households, most of whom bought their properties with funds that to a significant extent came from their parents. Home ownership rate for Chinese households below 35 in 2013 is around 55% based on data from the China Household Finance Survey, compared to 37% in the US. Wei and Zhang (2011) An alternative way to ask whether demand for housing is speculative and excessive is to assess whether the price of the asset is roughly equal to the value of the flow of services that the asset will deliver. In finance, this approach compares prices with flows of earnings or dividends (Shiller 2000) . High prices compared to earnings present candidate bubbles.
In the case of housing, the approach typically compares housing prices to rents, again assuming that rents capture the flow of services from owning the house. When interest rates are low, small differences in expectations about future growth rates can generate wild swings in the predicted price to rent ratio. As a result, some concluded that U.S. prices in 2005 were perfectly compatible with current rents and rationality (Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai, 2005) . In the Chinese case, renting is so rare that rental data is unavailable for units comparable to new
properties.
An alternative to rent is to compare prices to income, which The Economist has referred to as "a gauge of frothiness." 8 Fang et al. (2015) use this approach in their balanced discussion of whether China has "a housing bubble that is about to burst." They note both that "housing prices are indeed expensive to the income of many households," and that "price appreciation has been mostly accompanied by equally impressive income growth." They report "price-to-income ratios of around eight in second-and third-tier cities and, in some years, even over ten in first-tier cities." These ratios are quite high by global standards, but the parallel trends of income and price growth remind us that optimistic Chinese buyers look far more sensible than their
American counterparts who paid sky-high prices during the U.S. boom, despite only moderate U.S. economic growth during those years.
But a constant price-to-income ratio is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the existence of a bubble. If houses, or any product, can be built for a fixed cost of $100,000, then even if house prices temporarily rise above $100,000 and keep pace with rapid income growth, they may still ultimately fall down to the cost of supply. Alternatively, prices can rise faster than income growth in places with restricted supply, perhaps because amenities are increasing, and there is no reason for these high prices will later crash.
In China, educational and medical resources are heavily concentrated in major cities, and the hukou system restricts access to many resources to local residents. Home purchases and permanent residence in top tier cities is one step towards becoming local residents.
Consequently, high housing prices could in part reflect expectations about future demand for urban amenities.
Overall, price to rent or price to income ratios offers remarkably little precision about whether housing prices are too high or too low. Slight changes in projected growth or interest rates (Chinese mortgages are typically variable rate) cause the implied price to rent ratio (or price to income ratio) to change radically. Since we do not know the future value of urban amenities, it is hard to have any confidence about what the demand should be for urban space.
The Supply-Side Approach to Assessing Real Estate Bubbles
The demand-side calculations ignore the power of supply over housing prices. Glaeser (2013) argues that in the history of U.S. real estate bubbles, the most common mistake is for investors to ignore the role that supply plays in determining prices of housing and land. The large gap between construction costs and prices does not imply that developers are earning huge profits. Land is expensive and taxes are high. Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2015) have land prices of around 1,000 RMB per square meter (Deng et al., 2012) , and average sales price of around 5,000 to 10,000 RMB per square meter.
There are two ways in which the land cost contribution to building costs could decline, and bring prices closer in line with construction costs. First, Chinese cities could permit higher floor to area ratios. Floor-area ratios (FARs) determine the ratio of built floor space to land in an entire parcel, and thus reflect both building height and vacant land left around buildings. Despite the height of many Chinese buildings, actual FARs are relatively low. Cai et al. (2016) show average FAR limits for new residential construction of two in many cities (e.g., 2.12 in Beijing, 1.65 in Shanghai). At an FAR of 2, assuming that urban Chinese consume 40 square meters of net living space or 56 square meters of gross living space per capita in the long run, an urban population of 1.05 billion 12 will require 29.4 billion square meters of urban residential land, which is still less than China's 40 billion square meters of urban residential land. 13 Cities eager for more 11 http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~gyourko/chineselandpriceindex.html 12 Assuming population expands to 1.5 billion and urbanization rate reaches 70%. 13 https://web.stanford.edu/class/cee320/CEE320B/Seto.pdf development and for less sprawl could readily ratchet FARs upward. At an FAR of 10 as opposed to 2, accommodating 1.05 billion urban Chinese will require only seven billion square meters of urban land, not 29.4 billion.
The alternative path to lower land costs is to expand urban space in new cities. Shenzhen was a small town in 1980. Now it is a thriving megalopolis of 18 million. The urban space could expand substantially, and land constraint could be relaxed by freeing land up for urban purposes.
It is well within the power of the Chinese government to allow either enough new cities or higher FAR, either of which could create an ocean of new housing supply. In the next section, we will explore the impact that new supply could have on housing prices in 20 years.
Prices in Twenty Years
The Chinese investors who buy and hold empty properties are investing for the long run. In the section, we assess whether today's prices in Chinese cities will look reasonable in twenty years.
We consider a range of possible scenarios and compare price estimates both with the price today, and the price today plus 3 percent annual growth. If investors require a return of one percent per year over and above maintenance and depreciation costs (which we assume are roughly two percent), then prices need to rise by 80.6 percent in total over 20 years. Our estimation of future price derives from estimates of demand for and supply of housing in the long run. We produce our estimates separately for Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities. While Chinese cities have significant heterogeneity, each tier groups cities that are relatively similar in economic development.
Our demand calculations begin by assuming that the willingness to pay for housing will eventually settle on 10 times income, high by U.S. standards but not unusual in Europe. 14 In other words, we assume that all individuals with local incomes above one tenth of the price (P)
14 To justify this with a spatial equilibrium, assume that income for individual i in a city is denoted , and income in the reservation locale (rural China) is + (1 − ) . If the rural price is fixed by construction costs at , then the willingness to pay is + are willing to live in the location. The buyers are assumed to be the richest potential urbanites.
Consequently, if the income distribution is characterized by a cumulative distribution F(Y), then total demand for housing is N(1-F(Y*)) where N is the size of the "potential" urban population in this locale and 1-F(Y*) denotes the share with incomes above the cutoff value Y*, who will be home owners. The equilibrium price P* will equal ten times Y* by assumption.
Hence, we predict prices by using the equilibrium condition:
Housing Supply=Potential Urban Population * (1-F(P*/10))
This equation requires us to estimate the future distribution of income, the growth in the potential urban population and growth in the housing stock. Low housing supply and high population growth will both lower the fraction of households served. High income growth means that the willingness to pay for the same marginal buyer will be higher.
For the distribution of future household income, we start with the current distribution of income in each tier, based on data from the Urban Household Survey. We assume that the distribution is log-normal, consistent with the data. We then estimate the income distribution in 2030 based on assumptions of income growth rates. In the official statistics, real incomes for urban Chinese in the past ten years have grown by about 10 percent per year. Our baseline assumption is that average future growth in the next two decades will be one-half that size, but Figures 6a, 6b and 6c show results for a wide range of income projections.
We project that the growth in future potential urban population will mirror past growth in actual urban population, recognizing that past urban population reflects both changes in regional population patterns and changes in the urbanization rate. The first tier cities have high and stable urbanization of 90%, but they have experienced much higher total population growth than the national average. The population inflow comes from these cities' advantages in creating high paying jobs and the fact that educational, medical, and many other social resources, and these advantages seem unlikely to change. For the second tier cities, population growth has been at the national average, and the urbanization rate has been rising steadily. For the third tier cities, total population growth has been lower than the national average, due to labor outflow, but they are experiencing very rapid urbanization of the local population.
We assume that the first tier cities will continue to be highly urbanized, and that the growth in potential population will be higher than the projected national population growth rate. In second tier cities, we assume that potential population will increase at above the national rate because of increasing urbanization. The third tier cities are assumed to have regional population growth below the national average but growing urbanization rate.
For supply of housing, we start with current occupied housing stock and then add inventories and vacancies. New completion of floor space nationwide has risen to about 10 billion square feet per year in the past five years, up from around 6 billion in the mid 2000s. We consider a wide range of supply scenarios, from a lower bound of zero to an upper bound of about 8 billion square feet per year nationally. We assume that the existing housing stock depreciates by 2 percent per year.
Will there be enough space to accommodate that additional supply? While China is a very populous country, density in Chinese cities is typically much lower than major American metropolitan areas. For example, the first tier cities have population density varying from 1,000 to 2,000 people per square kilometer in 2010, whereas New York City has density of 10,000 people per square kilometer and the top 100 American MSAs all have density above 4,000 people per square kilometer. Our most extreme high supply scenario will less than double housing stock in the first tier cities, and the more probable range we consider will add less than 25% housing space. It is also unlikely that population growth in the first tier cities can significantly exceed our estimate of 40% in the next twenty years, and this population growth rate will still put top tier Chinese cities at lower density than many American cities. Table 2a summarizes the specific parameter values we assume. Since our data and projections of housing stock is based on the urban core in each city, which has roughly 60% of total urban population, we also by .6 to capture the core's share of total population. This potential urban population may not all be home owners in the city. Those who cannot afford housing may rent or live outside of the urban core. Finally, we assume that per capita housing consumption in 2030 will be 430.56 square feet, or 40 square meters, up from 30 square meters in the 2010 census. These examples confirm that very high price growth seems unlikely, but as long as income growth remains robust, the downside in the eventual long-run equilibrium also appears to be modest.
Figures 6a, 6b, and 6c show long-run price estimates for each tier as a function of income growth and new supply. They present a wide range of possible future scenarios. Here we translate price estimate to average annualized house price growth from 2010 to 2030. We also draw a line that denotes the parameter values needed to achieve an average 3% annual real returns. Parameter values below the line will generate price growth that exceeds three percent returns. It is quite possible that different tiers may end up in different housing market outcomes, depending on economic growth and housing supply.
For both 1 st tier and 2 nd tier cities, 3% annual real return is quite difficult to achieve. It requires annual real income of at least 6% to 7%, which is very optimistic for the average pace in the next 20 years, together with new supply close to zero. If supply persists at the average level of 2000 to 2010, returns will be minimal or negative unless income growth turns out to be spectacular. For the 3 rd tier cities, our simulation provides some room for future price growth, as long as supply does not overwhelm the market. The results are driven by the fact that these cities have the largest scope for increased urbanization, and their current prices are generally low.
Overall, these simulations show a possible range of prices, depending on income growth, potential urban population growth and housing supply growth. Of these three determinants of future prices, the Chinese government has the most capacity to shape housing supply growth.
With sufficiently controlled housing supply, current prices can be maintained, but if housing supply continues to aggressively deliver new space, prices will fall.
Conclusion
In many respects, China looks like a classic housing bubble. Prices have soared. New construction is enormous. Vacancies are large and pervasive. It is tempting to view these events from afar and conclude that a price drop is imminent.
As we try to demonstrate, this scenario is far from certain. Chinese home buyers appear to be investing for the long run, and are unlikely to sell voluntarily even if home prices decline. Nor are they heavily leveraged, so repossessions and liquidations of homes are unlikely. Chinese developers are more leveraged, but are cozy with state banks, so their loans are likely to be restructured. Even if banks repossess properties from developers, they are unlikely to dump them on the market. Compared to Chinese stocks, more inertia is built into the housing market.
And then there is the critical role of the Chinese government in housing markets. The demand for urbanization in China is so large that if the government acts to sharply restrict new supply, it can probably maintain prices at close to current market levels. If the government buys up excess inventory, perhaps to convert it to social housing as it has started to do in 2015, it can further bolster softening prices. There does appear to be a feasible public path towards price stability.
Yet that path may create significant social costs. Construction employment would plummet.
Millions of Chinese may lose the apparent productivity advantages associated with living in Chinese cities (Chauvin et al. 2016) . Local governments would lose the financial autonomy from land sales and taxes that has been their institutional basis.
The alternative for the Chinese government is to accommodate high levels of construction and housing supply. As we showed, this will lead to very low or negative expected returns to investment in housing. The welfare of potential new buyers will rise, but current owners will suffer losses. Fang et al. (2015) . Inventory area per capita is calculated from local housing bureau (Fangguanju) data for 2014 compiled by Soufun, and vacant area per capita is calculated based on 2009 Urban Household Survey. Urban population is from 2010 census. Column 5 is column 2 multiplied by column 4, and column 6 is column 3 multiplied by column 4. Column 7 is the sum of columns (5) and (6). We assume 4th tier cities have the same inventory per capita as 3rd tier cities.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Note: Housing price index data for China are from Fang et al. (2015) . Housing price index data for MSAs in the US are from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. We construct tiers in the US by ranking US MSAs based on 1990 income per capita, and assign tiers so that each tier has the same population share as that in China; the richest MSAs are assigned to 1 st tier and so on so forth. We calculate real price index using nominal price index adjusted for inflation. Price indices in each tier are weighted averages of city level price indices. Note: Developer inventory data is from local housing bureau (Fangguanju), and compiled by Soufun. Because the data does not cover all the cities, our estimates of inventory in each tier is based on inventory per capita by tier multiplied by urban population in each tier. We also assume the 4 th tier cities have the same inventory per capita as the 3 rd tier cities. In total, the estimates are based on 262 prefecture level cities: 4 cities in the first tier, 34 in the second tier and 84 in the third and 140 in the fourth. 
